The Differential Effects of Oil Demand and Supply Shocks on the Global Economy by Cashin, Paul et al.
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge Working 
Papers in Economics 
 
The Differential Effects of 
Oil Demand and Supply Shocks 
on the Global Economy 
 
Paul Cashin, Kamiar Mohaddes, 
Maziar Raissi, and Mehdi Raissi 
CWPE 1249 
The Di¤erential E¤ects of Oil Demand and Supply
Shocks on the Global Economy
Paul Cashina, Kamiar Mohaddesb, Maziar Raissic, and Mehdi Raissiay
a International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, USA
b Faculty of Economics and Girton College, University of Cambridge, UK
c Department of Mathematical Sciences, George Mason University, USA
October 16, 2012
Abstract
We employ a set of sign restrictions on the generalized impulse responses of a Global
VAR model, estimated for 38 countries/regions over the period 1979Q22011Q2, to
discriminate between supply-driven and demand-driven oil-price shocks and to study
the time prole of their macroeconomic e¤ects for di¤erent countries. The results
indicate that the economic consequences of a supply-driven oil-price shock are very
di¤erent from those of an oil-demand shock driven by global economic activity, and
vary for oil-importing countries compared to energy exporters. While oil importers
typically face a long-lived fall in economic activity in response to a supply-driven surge
in oil prices, the impact is positive for energy-exporting countries that possess large
proven oil/gas reserves. However, in response to an oil-demand disturbance, almost
all countries in our sample experience long-run inationary pressures and a short-run
increase in real output.
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1 Introduction
How do oil-price shocks a¤ect real output, ination, the real e¤ective exchange rate, interest
rates, and equity prices in di¤erent countries, including major oil exporters? We identify two
groups of explanatory factors as the main drivers of the evolution of crude oil prices: (i) fast-
growing demand due to high global economic growth; and (ii) declining supply or anticipated
production shortfalls in the future. We employ a set of sign restrictions on the generalized
impulse responses of a Global VAR (GVAR) model to identify the underlying demand and
supply shocks in the world crude oil market, and to study the macroeconomic consequences
of oil-price uctuations across di¤erent countries (including both commodity importers and
exporters). Compared to Dees et al. (2007), the current paper advances the work on GVAR
modelling in the following directions: (i) we extend the geographical coverage of the GVAR
model to major oil exporters as well as other countries in the Middle East and North Africa
region; (ii) we extend the sample period until the second quarter of 2011, thus including
both the recent oil price boom (20022008) as well as the initial oil-supply disruptions which
accompanied the Arab Spring (December 2010 onwards); (iii) we allow for the simultaneous
determination of oil prices, oil production, and several macroeconomic variables in a global
setting; and (iv) we demonstrate how a GVAR model, covering over 90% of world GDP, 85%
of world oil consumption, and 80% of world proven oil reserves, can be used for structural
impulse response analysis following an oil-price shock.
There is a growing literature that employs sign restrictions on impulse responses as a way
of identifying shocks in structural VARs see, for example, Faust (1998), Uhlig (2005), and
Canova and Nicoló (2002). This paper extends this approach to a GVAR framework in which
the cross-sectional dimension of the model is utilized to identify shocks that are global in
nature i.e. shocks that a¤ect many countries simultaneously. Fry and Pagan (2011) argue
that sign restrictions solve the parametric identication problem present in structural VARs
but leave the model identication problem unresolved. The latter refers to the fact that
there are many models with identied parameters that provide the same t to the data. We
show that the global dimension by o¤ering a large number of additional sign restrictions
can signicantly narrow the number of plausible models that satisfy a priori restrictions, and
therefore can move us one step closer to calculating the true structural impulse responses.
The GVAR literature almost exclusively focuses on business cycle linkages among ad-
vanced and major emerging market economies, with limited attention to growth spillovers
to/from major oil exporters (e.g. the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) member states). While the international business cycle is very important for the
economic performance of commodity exporters, macroeconomic and political developments
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in this group of countries also have large consequences for the rest of the world through their
impact on global oil prices. In contrast to the existing literature, we use a GVAR model
including major oil exporters to disentangle the size and speed of the transmission of di¤er-
ent oil-price shocks to the global economy. This approach employs a dynamic multi-country
framework for the analysis of the international transmission of shocks. The framework com-
prises 38 country/region-specic models, among which is a single Euro Area region (com-
prising 8 of the 11 countries that joined Euro in 1999) as well as the countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). These individual models are solved in a global setting where
core macroeconomic variables of each economy are related to corresponding foreign variables,
which have been constructed to match the international trade pattern of the country under
consideration. The model has both real and nancial variables: real GDP, ination, real
equity prices, real e¤ective exchange rate, short and long-term interest rates, a measure of
global oil production, and the price of oil. We treat the latter endogenously as the question
of whether oil prices are demand-driven or supply-driven often reignites debate about their
exogenous or endogenous treatment in macroeconomic models. Our framework is able to
account for various transmission channels, including not only trade relationships but also
nancial linkages through interest rates, equity prices, and exchange rates (see Dees et al.
(2007) for more details).
We estimate the 38 individual VARX* models over the period 1979Q22011Q2. Having
solved the GVAR model, we examine the e¤ect of oil-demand and oil-supply shocks on the
macroeconomic variables of di¤erent countries. Our results indicate that the economic con-
sequences of a supply-driven oil-price shock are very di¤erent from those of an oil-demand
shock driven by changes in global economic activity; and very di¤erent for oil-importing
countries when compared with energy exporters. We nd that while oil importers typically
face a long-lived fall in economic activity in response to a supply-driven surge in oil prices,
the impact is positive for energy-exporting countries that possess large proven oil/gas re-
serves. However, in response to an oil-demand disturbance, almost all countries in our sample
experience long-run inationary pressures, and a short-run increase in real outputs.
Our paper is related to several important contributions in the literature. Using a VAR
framework for the case of the United States, Kilian (2009) decomposes oil-price shocks into
three types an oil-supply shock, an oil-demand shock driven by economic activity, and an
oil-specic demand shock driven by expectations about future changes in oil conditions
and concludes that the macroeconomic e¤ect of the most recent oil price surge was generally
moderate until mid-2007. This observation could be interpreted as evidence of the key role
played by the demand side in explaining the recent boom in oil prices. Had the shock
been triggered by supply-side factors, global aggregate demand would have fallen, because
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a negative supply shock is perceived to be a tax on oil consumers (with a high propensity
to consume) in favor of oil producers (with a lower propensity to consume). Following
a supply-driven oil price shock and in the presence of non-linearities in the product and
labor markets (for example price and wage rigidities), production costs increase and as a
result ination rises; often prompting central banks to raise their policy rates, and placing
additional downward pressure on growth.1 However, in response to a demand-driven oil
price shock, combined with a near vertical oil supply curve, ination rises temporarily, see
for instance Kilian (2009). Overall, while the increase in oil prices in the run-up to nancial
crisis (2002-07) can be attributed to booming economic activity in emerging economies, and
higher demand for oil (as well as other commodities), the stagationary situation post-2007,
can be associated with supply side factors. Indeed, Hamilton (2009) argues that the economic
recession of the past few years was precipitated by high oil prices.
Most papers in the literature that investigate the e¤ects of oil shocks on macroeconomic
variables have focused on a handful of industrialized/OECD countries, and in most cases they
have looked at the impact of oil shocks exclusively on the United States (and in isolation
from the rest of the world). Moreover, the focus of those analysis has predominantly been
on net oil importers see, for example, Blanchard and Gali (2007), Hamilton (2009), Kilian
(2009), and Peersman and Van Robays (2012). Esfahani et al. (2012a) is an exception,
as they look at the direct e¤ects of oil-revenue shocks on domestic output for 9 major oil
exporters, six of which are OPEC members. But they do not investigate the di¤erential
e¤ects of demand- versus supply-driven oil-price shocks. Another exception is Chapter 4
of International Monetary Fund (2012) World Economic Outlook (WEO), which provides
a discussion of the e¤ects of commodity price shocks on commodity exporters, using the
methodology in Kilian (2009).2 Therefore, our paper is complementary to the analysis of the
e¤ects of oil-price shocks on advanced economies, given its wide country coverage, including
both major oil exporters (located in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America) as well as
many developing countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the GVAR methodology
while Section 3 outlines our modelling approach and presents the country-specic estimates
and tests. Moreover, we provide evidence for the weak exogeneity assumption of the country-
specic foreign variables and discuss the issue of structural breaks in the context of our GVAR
model. Section 4 explains the identication procedure used in this paper and investigates
the macroeconomic e¤ects of oil-supply and oil-demand shocks. Finally, Section 5 concludes
1See Raissi (2011) for a discussion of the optimal monetary policy in the presence of labor market ine¢ -
ciencies.
2See also Cavalcanti et al. (2011) and Cavalcanti et al. (2012) for two recent panel studies.
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and o¤ers some policy recommendations.
2 The Global VAR (GVAR) Methodology
We consider N + 1 countries in the global economy, indexed by i = 0; 1; :::; N . With the
exception of the United States, which we label as 0 and take to be the reference country,
all other N countries are modelled as small open economies. This set of individual VARX*
models is used to build the GVAR framework. Following Pesaran (2004) and Dees et al.
(2007), a VARX* (si; si ) model for the ith country relates a ki  1 vector of domestic
macroeconomic variables (treated as endogenous), xit, to a ki  1 vector of country-specic
foreign variables (taken to be weakly exogenous), xit, and to a md  1 vector of observed
global factors, dt, which could include such variables as commodity prices:
i (L; si)xit = ai0 + ai1t+i (L; s

i )x

it +i (L; s

i )dt + uit; (1)
for t = 1; 2; :::; T , where ai0 and ai1 are ki  1 vectors of xed intercepts and coe¢ cients
on the deterministic time trends, respectively, and uit is a ki  1 vector of country-specic
shocks, which we assume are serially uncorrelated with zero mean and a non-singular co-
variance matrix, ii, namely uit s i:i:d: (0;ii). Furthermore, i (L; si) = I  
Psi
i=1iL
i,
i (L; s

i ) =
Psi
i=0iL
i, and i (L; si ) =
Psi
i=0iL
i are the matrix lag polynomial of the
coe¢ cients associated with the domestic, foreign, and global variables, respectively. As the
lag orders for these variables, si and si ; are selected on a country-by-country basis, we are
explicitly allowing for i (L; si), i (L; si ), and i (L; s

i ) to di¤er across countries.
The country-specic foreign variables are constructed as cross-sectional averages of the
domestic variables using data on bilateral trade as the weights, wij:
xit =
NX
j=0
wijxjt; (2)
where j = 0; 1; :::N; wii = 0; and
PN
j=0wij = 1. For empirical application, the trade weights
are computed as xed weights based on the average trade ows measured over the period
2006 to 2008. However, the weights can be based on any time period and can be allowed to
be time-varying.3
Although estimation is done on a country-by-country basis, the GVAR model is solved
3The main justication for using bilateral trade weights, as opposed to nancial weights, is that the
former have been shown to be the most important determinant of business cycle comovements (see Baxter
and Kouparitsas (2005) among others).
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for the world as a whole, taking account of the fact that all variables are endogenous to the
system as a whole. After estimating each country VARX*(si; si ) model separately, all the
k =
PN
i=0 ki endogenous variables, collected in the k  1 vector xt = (x00t;x01t; :::;x0Nt)0, need
to be solved simultaneously using the link matrix dened in terms of the country-specic
weights. To see this, we can write the VARX* model in equation (1) more compactly as:
Ai (L; si; s

i ) zit = 'it; (3)
for i = 0; 1; :::; N; where
Ai (L; si; s

i ) = [i (L; si) i (L; si )] ; zit = (x0it;x0it)0 ;
'it = ai0 + ai1t+i (L; s

i )dt + uit: (4)
Note that given equation (2) we can write:
zit =Wixt; (5)
where Wi = (Wi0;Wi1; :::;WiN), with Wii = 0, is the (ki + ki )  k weight matrix for
country i dened by the country-specic weights, wij. Using (5) we can write equation (3)
as:
Ai (L; s)Wixt = 'it; (6)
whereAi (L; s) is constructed fromAi (L; si; si ) by setting s = max (s0; s1; :::; sN ; s

0; s

1; :::; s

N)
and augmenting the s   si or s   si additional terms in the power of the lag operator by
zeros. Stacking equation (6), we obtain the Global VAR(s) model in domestic variables only:
G (L; s)xt = 't; (7)
where
G (L; s) =
0BBBBBBBBB@
A0 (L; s)W0
A1 (L; s)W1
.
.
.
AN (L; s)WN
1CCCCCCCCCA
; 't =
0BBBBBBBBB@
'0t
'1t
.
.
.
'Nt
1CCCCCCCCCA
: (8)
For an illustration of the solution of the GVAR model, using a VARX*(1; 1) model,
see Pesaran (2004), and for a detailed exposition of the GVAR methodology see Dees et al.
(2007). The GVAR(s) model in equation (7) can be solved recursively and used for a number
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of purposes, such as forecasting or impulse response analysis.
3 A Global VARModel Including Major Oil Exporters
We extend the country coverage of the GVAR dataset used in Dees et al. (2007) by adding
11 major oil exporters located in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, as well as
another six oil-importing countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,
see Table 1.4 Thus our version of the GVAR model covers 50 countries as opposed to the
"standard" 33 country set-up used in the literature, see Smith and Galesi (2010), and extends
the coverage both in terms of major oil exporters and also by including an important region
of the world when it comes to oil supply, the MENA region.5
Of the 50 countries included in our sample, 17 are oil exporters, of which 10 are current
members of the OPEC and one is a former member (Indonesia left OPEC in January 2009).
We were not able to include Angola and Iraq, the remaining two OPEC members, due to
the lack of su¢ ciently long time series data. This was also the case for Russia, the second-
largest oil exporter in the world, for which quarterly data is not available for the majority
of our sample period. Our sample also includes three OECD oil exporters and the United
Kingdom, which remained a net oil exporter for the majority of the sample (until 2006), and
therefore is treated as an oil exporter when it comes to imposing sign-restrictions (see the
discussion in Section 4). These 50 countries together cover over 90% of world GDP, 85%
of world oil consumption, and 80% of world proven oil reserves. Thus our sample is rather
comprehensive.
For empirical applications, we create two regions; one of which comprises the six Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and the other is the Euro Area block comprising 8 of the
11 countries that initially joined the euro on January 1, 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. The time series data for the GCC block and
the Euro Area block are constructed as cross-sectionally weighted averages of the domestic
variables (described in detail below), using Purchasing Power Parity GDP weights, averaged
over the 2006-2008 period. Thus, as displayed in Table 1, the GVAR model that we specify
includes 38 country/region-specic VARX* models.
4Although Bahrain and Oman are not OPEC member countries, we include them in the OPEC block as
we treat all the GCC countries as a region. Note that using GDP PPP weights, Bahrain and Oman are less
than 8% of the total GDP of the GCC.
5For an extensive discussion on the impact of three systemic economies (China, Euro Area, and the U.S.)
on the MENA region, see Cashin et al. (2012).
6
Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model with Major Oil Exporters
Oil Exporters Oil Importers
OPEC Members Major Importers Latin America
Algeria China Argentina
Ecuador Euro Area Brazil
GCC Countries Austria Chile
Bahrain Belgium Peru
Kuwait Finland
Oman France Emerging Asia
Qatar Germany Korea
Saudi Arabia Italy Malaysia
UAE Netherlands Philippines
Indonesia Spain Singapore
Iran Japan Thailand
Libya United States
Nigeria
Venezuela MENA Rest of the World
Egypt Australia
OECD Exporters Jordan India
Canada Mauritania New Zealand
Mexico Morocco South Africa
Norway Syria Sweden
United Kingdom Tunisia Switzerland
Turkey
Notes: indicates that the country has been added to the Smith and Galesi (2010) database. OECD refers to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OPEC is the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries, and MENA refers to the countries in the Middle East and North Africa region.
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3.1 Variables
The macroeconomic variables included in the individual VARX* models depend on both the
modelling strategy employed as well as whether data on a particular variable is available.
Each country-specic model has a maximum of six domestic (endogenous) variables and
ve foreign (exogenous) variables. We also include two global variables, each of which is
treated endogenously in only one country, while being weakly exogenous in the remaining
37 country models. Below we describe the di¤erent variables included in our model and
provide justication for our modelling specication. For various data sources used to build
the quarterly GVAR dataset, covering 1979Q2 to 2011Q2, see the Data Appendix.
3.1.1 Domestic Variables
Real GDP, yit, the rate of ination, it, short-term interest rate, rSit, long-term interest
rate, rLit, and real equity prices, eqit are the ve domestic variables that are included in our
model, as well as most of the GVAR applications in the literature. These ve variables are
constructed as:
yit = ln(GDPit); it = pit   pit 1; pit = ln(CPIit); eqit = ln (EQit=CPIit) ;
rSit = 0:25 ln(1 +R
S
it=100); r
L
it = 0:25 ln(1 +R
L
it=100); (9)
where GDPit is the real Gross Domestic Product at time t for country i, CPIit is the
consumer price index, EQit is a nominal Equity Price Index, and RSit (R
L
it) is the short-term
(long-term) interest rate.
The GVAR literature also includes a sixth domestic variable, representing the real ex-
change rate and dened as eit   pit, that is the log of the nominal exchange rate of country
i, ln (Eit) ; deated by the domestic CPI. However, in a multi-country set-up, it might be
better to consider a measure of the real e¤ective exchange rate, rather than eit   pit. We
therefore follow Dees et al. (2007) and construct such a variable, reerit.
To construct the real e¤ective exchange rate for country i, we simply take the nomi-
nal e¤ective exchange rate, neerit, add the log of foreign price level (pit) and subtract the
domestic (pit) price level. Note that neerit is a weighted average of the bilateral exchange
rates between country i and all of its trading partners j, where j = 0; :::; N: In the current
application we have a total of 36 countries and two regions in our model, N = 37, therefore
we can use the nominal exchange rates denominated in U.S. dollars for each country, eit, to
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calculate reerit. More specically:
reerit = neerit + p

it   pit
=
37X
j=0
wij (eit   ejt) + pit   pit; (10)
where the foreign price is calculated as the weighted sum of log price level indices (pjt) of
country is trading partners, pit =
37X
j=0
wijpjt, and wij is the trade share of country j for
country i. Given that
37X
j=0
wij = 1 and eit =
37X
j=0
wijejt, the real e¤ective exchange rate can
be written as:
reerit = eit   eit + pit   pit
= (eit   pit)  (eit   pit) : (11)
This constructed measure of the real e¤ective exchange rate is then included in our model
as the sixth domestic variable.
3.1.2 Foreign Variables
We include ve foreign variables in our model. In particular, all domestic variables, except for
that of the real e¤ective exchange rate, have corresponding foreign variables. The exclusion
of reerit is simply because reerit already includes both domestic, eit   pit, and foreign,
eit  pit, nominal exchanges rates deated by the appropriate price levels, see equation (11).
Therefore, reerit does not by itself have any economic meaning. The foreign variables are
all computed as in equation (2), or more specically:
yit =
37X
j=0
wijyjt; eq

it =
37X
j=0
wijeqjt; 

it = p

it   pit 1
rSit =
37X
j=0
wijr
S
jt; r
L
it =
37X
j=0
wijr
L
jt: (12)
The trade weights, wij, are computed as a three-year average to reduce the impact of
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individual yearly movements on the weights:6
wij =
Tij;2006 + Tij;2007 + Tij;2008
Ti;2006 + Ti;2007 + Ti;2008
; (13)
where Tijt is the bilateral trade of country i with country j during a given year t and is
calculated as the average of exports and imports of country i with j, and Tit =
PN
j=0 Tijt
(the total trade of country i) for t = 2006; 2007; 2008; in the case of all countries. The trade
shares used to construct the foreign variables are given in the 38  38 matrix provided in
Table 9 of the Data Appendix.
3.1.3 Global Variables
Given that we want to consider the macroeconomic e¤ects of oil shocks on the global economy,
we also need to include nominal oil prices (in U.S. dollars), P oilt , as well as the quantity of oil
produced in the world, Qoilt . A key question is how should these two variables be included
in the GVAR model? Since we will estimate the model over the second quarter of 1979 to
the second quarter of 2011, we look at oil consumption over this period for the four largest
oil importers in the world, as well as for di¤erent country groupings. Table 2 shows that the
United States consumed on average about 27% of world oil between 19792010. Comparing
this to the other three major oil importers (China, Euro Area, and Japan), we note that U.S.
consumption is far larger than any of these countries or even the other regions in the world
considered in this paper. In fact the sum of consumption of the other major oil importers is
26:6%, which is still below that of the United States. Therefore, as is now standard in the
literature, we include log oil prices, poilt , as a "global variable" determined in the U.S. VARX*
model; that is the price of oil is included in the U.S. model as an endogenous variable while
it is treated as weakly exogenous in the model for all other countries.
Turning to the largest oil exporters in the world, we notice from Table 3 that Saudi
Arabia, and more specically the GCC countries, play an important role when it comes
to world oil supply. Not only do these six countries produce more than 22% of world oil
and export around 30% of the world total, which is almost three times that of the OECD
oil exporters, the six GCC countries also possess 36.3% of the worlds proven oil reserves.7
Moreover, Saudi Arabia is not only the largest oil producer and exporter in the world, but
6A similar approach has also typically been followed in Global VAR models estimated in the literature.
See, for example, Dees et al. (2007).
7Note that proven reserves at any given point in time are dened as "quantities of oil that geological
and engineering information indicate with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known
reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions" (British Petroleum Statistical Review of World
Energy), thus this measure could be uncertain.
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it also has the largest spare capacity and as such is often seen as a global swing producer.
For example, in September of 1985, Saudi production was increased from 2 million barrels
per day (mbd) to 4.7 mbd, and more recently Saudi Arabia has increased its production to
stabilize the oil market. Therefore, given the status of the GCC countries with regard to oil
supply, we include log of oil production, qoilt , as an endogenous variable in the GCC block,
and as a weakly exogenous variable in all other countries. Accordingly, qoilt is the second
"global variable" in our model.
Table 2: Oil Consumption by Oil Importers, averages over 19792010
Major Importers Million Percent Other Oil Importers Million Percent
Barrels/day of World Barrels/day of World
China 3.1 4.8 Latin America 2.1 3.3
Euro Area 9.3 14.5 Emerging Asia 2.6 4.0
Japan 4.7 7.4 Rest of the World 3.5 5.5
United States 17.3 26.9 World 64.1 100.0
Source: Oil consumption data is from the British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy. For country
groupings see Table 1.
Table 3: Oil Reserves, Production and Exports of Major Oil Exporters, averages
over 20082010
Country Oil Production Oil Exports Oil Reserves
Million Percent Million Percent Billion Percent
Barrels/day of World Barrels/day of World Barrels of World
OPEC Members 32.0 39.3 20.7 53.1 937 68.6
GCC Countries 18.0 22.1 11.7 29.9 496 36.3
Saudi Arabia 10.2 12.6 6.7 17.3 264 19.4
OECD Oil Exporters 8.6 10.6 4.6 11.7 51 3.7
World 81.5 100.0 39.0 100.0 1365 100.0
Source: Oil reserve and production data is from the British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy
and oil export data is from the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin. For country groupings see Table 1.
Making one region out of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates, is not without any economic reasoning. The rationale is that the GCC
countries have in recent decades implemented a number of policies and initiatives to foster
economic and nancial integration with a view to establishing a monetary union based on
the Euro Area model. Given the increased integration of these economies over the last three
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decades, a peg to a common currency (the U.S. dollar), exible labor markets, and open
capital accounts, it is therefore reasonable to group these countries as one region.8
3.2 Model Specication
Given the discussion in Section 3.1, we specify three di¤erent sets of individual country-
specic models. The rst specication is common across all countries apart from the United
States and the GCC block. These 36 VARX* models include six endogenous/domestic
variables, when available, ve country-specic foreign variables, and two global variables,
see Table 4. Using the same terminology as in equation (1), the 6 1 vector of endogenous
and the 51 vector of exogenous variables are given by xit =

yit; it; eqit; r
S
it; r
L
it; reerit
0
and xit =

yit; 

it; eq

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
respectively, while the 2 1 vector of global variables is
dened as dt =

poilt ; q
oil
t
0
:
The second specication relates to the GCC block only, for which the log of oil production,
qoilt , is included in the model endogenously in addition to the three domestic variables in xit,
while xit and the log of nominal oil prices, p
oil
t , are included as weakly exogenous variables.
Table 4: Variables Specication of the Country-specic VARX* Models
The U.S. Model The GCC Model All Other Models
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
yUS;t y

US;t yGCC;t y

GCC;t yit y

it
US;t 

US;t GCC;t 

GCC;t it 

it
eqUS;t     eqGCC;t eqit eqit
rSUS;t r
S
US;t   rSGCC;t rSit rSit
rLUS;t     rLGCC;t rLit rLit
  eUS;t   pUS;t reerGCC;t   reerit  
poilt     poilt   poilt
  qoilt qoilt     qoilt
Notes: For the denition of the variables see equations (9) and (11).
Finally, the U.S. model is specied di¤erently from the others, mainly because of the
dominance of the United States in the world economy. Firstly, based on the discussion
above regarding oil consumption, the price of oil is included in the model endogenously.
Secondly, given the importance of U.S. nancial variables in the global economy, the U.S.-
specic foreign nancial variables, eqUS;t and r
L
US;t, are not included in this model. The
exclusion of these two variables was also conrmed by our preliminary analysis, in which
8See Mohaddes and Williams (2012) for more details.
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the weak exogeneity assumption was rejected for eqUS;t and r
L
US;t in the U.S. model. Finally,
since eit is expressed as domestic currency price of a United States dollar, eUS;t   pUS;t, it is
by construction determined outside this model. Thus, instead of the real e¤ective exchange
rate, we included eUS;t   pUS;t as a weakly exogenous foreign variable in the U.S. model.
3.3 Country-Specic Estimates and Tests
Initial estimations and tests of the individual VARX*(si; si ) models are conducted under the
assumption that the country-specic foreign and global variables are weakly exogenous and
integrated of order one, I (1), and that the parameters of the models are stable over time.
As both assumptions are needed for the construction and the implementation of the GVAR
model, we will test and provide evidence for these assumptions in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
For the interpretation of the long-run relations, and also to ensure that we do not work
with a mixture of I(1) and I(2) variables, we need to consider the unit root properties of
the core variables in our country-specic models, see Table 4. If the domestic, xit, foreign,
xit, and global, dt, variables included in the country-specic models are indeed integrated of
order one, I (1), we are not only able to distinguish between short- and long-run relations, but
also to interpret the long-run relations as cointegrating. Therefore, we perform Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests on the level and rst di¤erences of all the variables. However, as
the power of unit root tests are often low, we also utilize the weighted symmetric ADF test
(ADF-WS) of Park and Fuller (1995), as it has been shown to have better power properties
than the ADF test. This analysis results in over 3200 unit root tests, which overall, as a
rst-order approximation, support the treatment of the variables in our model as being I(1).
For brevity, these test results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon
request.
3.3.1 Lag Order Selection, Cointegrating Relations, and Persistence Proles
We use quarterly observations over the period 1979Q22011Q2, across the di¤erent specica-
tions in Table 4, to estimate the 38 country/region-specic VARX*(si; si ) models. However,
prior to estimation we need to determine the lag orders of the domestic and foreign variables,
si and si . For this purpose, we use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) applied to the
underlying unrestricted VARX* models. However, given the constraints imposed by data
limitations, we set the maximum lag orders to smax = 2 and smax = 1. The selected VARX*
orders are reported in Table 5, from which we can see that for most countries a VARX*(2; 1)
specication seems satisfactory, except for seven countries (Australia, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia,
Mexico, Singapore, and the United Kingdom) for which s = s = 1 is selected by AIC.
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Table 5: Lag Orders of the Country-specic VARX*(s,s*) Models together with
the Number of Cointegrating Relations (r)
VARX* Order Cointegrating VARX* Order Cointegrating
Country si si relations (ri) Country si s

i relations (ri)
Algeria 2 1 1 Morocco 2 1 1
Argentina 2 1 2 Mauritania 2 1 1
Australia 1 1 3 Mexico 1 1 2
Brazil 2 1 1 Nigeria 2 1 2
Canada 2 1 2 Norway 2 1 3
China 2 1 1 New Zealand 2 1 3
Chile 2 1 2 Peru 2 1 1
Ecuador 2 1 1 Philippines 2 1 1
Egypt 1 1 2 South Africa 2 1 1
Euro Area 2 1 1 Singapore 1 1 2
GCC 2 1 2 Sweden 2 1 3
India 2 1 1 Switzerland 2 1 2
Indonesia 2 1 2 Syria 2 1 2
Iran 1 1 1 Thailand 2 1 2
Japan 2 1 2 Tunisia 2 1 1
Jordan 2 1 3 Turkey 2 1 1
Korea 2 1 1 UK 1 1 1
Libya 2 1 1 USA 2 1 2
Malaysia 1 1 1 Venezuela 2 1 1
Notes: si and si denote the lag order for the domestic and foreign variables respectively and are selected
by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The number of cointegrating relations (ri) are selected using
the trace test statistics based on the 95% critical values from MacKinnon (1991) for all countries except
for Australia, Euro Area, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, South Africa, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand,
Tunisia, and the United States, for which we use the 95% simulated critical values computed by stochastic
simulations and 1000 replications, and for Canada, China, Korea, Peru, Philippines, the UK, for which we
reduced ri below that suggested by the trace statistic to ensure the stability of the global model.
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Having established the order of the 38 VARX* models, we proceed to determine the num-
ber of long-run relations. Cointegration tests with the null hypothesis of no cointegration,
one cointegrating relation, and so on are carried out using Johansens maximal eigenvalue
and trace statistics as developed in Pesaran et al. (2000) for models with weakly exogenous
I (1) regressors, unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coe¢ cients. We choose the num-
ber of cointegrating relations (ri) based on the trace test statistics, given that it has better
small sample properties than the maximal eigenvalue test, initially using the 95% critical
values from MacKinnon (1991).9
We then consider the e¤ects of system-wide shocks on the exactly identied cointegrating
vectors using persistence proles developed by Lee and Pesaran (1993) and Pesaran and Shin
(1996). On impact the persistence proles (PPs) are normalized to take the value of unity,
but the rate at which they tend to zero provides information on the speed with which
equilibrium correction takes place in response to shocks. The PPs could initially over-shoot,
thus exceeding unity, but must eventually tend to zero if the vector under consideration is
indeed cointegrated. In our preliminary analysis of the PPs we noticed that the speed of
convergence was very slow for some countries, and for a few, the system-wide shocks never
really died out. In particular, the speed of adjustment was very slow for the following 18
countries (with ri based on critical values from MacKinnon (1991) in brackets): Australia
(4), Canada (4), China (2), Euro Area (2), Indonesia (3), Iran (2), Japan (3), Korea (4),
Malaysia (2), Peru (3), Philippines (2), South Africa (2), Singapore (3), Switzerland (3),
Thailand (3), Tunisia (2), the United Kingdom (2), and the United States (3).
Moreover, we noticed that a couple of eigenvalues of the GVAR model were larger than
unity; rendering the global model unstable. To deal with this issue, and the possible over-
estimation of the number of cointegrating relations (using asymptotic critical values), we
estimated a cointegrating VARX* model using the lag orders in Table 5 for each of the 18
countries separately. We then used the trace test statistics together with the 95% simulated
critical values (computed by stochastic simulations using 127 observations from 1979Q4 to
2011Q2 and 1000 replications), to determine the number of cointegrating vectors.10
We then re-estimated the global model reducing the number of cointegrating relations
(for the 18 countries only) one by one, and re-examined the PPs after each estimation to
ensure stability of the model. The nal selection of the number of cointegrating relations
are reported in Table 5. For 12 of the 18 countries we selected ri based on the trace statistic
and the simulated critical values. For four countries (China, Peru, Philippines, and the UK)
9To save space the lag order and cointegration test results are not reported here but are available on
request.
10The estimations were done in Microt 5.0. For further technical details see Pesaran and Pesaran (2009),
Section 22.10.
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Figure 1: Persistence Proles of the E¤ect of a System-wide Shock to the Coin-
tegrating Relations
Notes: Figures are median e¤ects of a system-wide shock to the cointegrating relations with 95% boot-
strapped condence bounds.
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the asymptotic and simulated critical values were the same so we reduced ri until the PPs
for each country were well behaved; this was also done for Canada and Korea.
The persistence proles for the set of 16 focus countries, the four largest oil importers
and 12 oil exporters in our model (see Table 1), together with their 95% bootstrapped error
bands are provided in Figure 1. The proles overshoot for only 5 out of the 25 cointegrating
vectors before quickly tending to zero. The speed of convergence is very fast, the half-life
of the shocks are generally less than 3 quarters, and equilibrium is established before 6
years in all cases except for Libya. Amongst the 16 countries, Iran shows the fastest rate
of convergence (around 3 years),11 and Libya the slowest rate of convergence (8-9 years).
The 95% error bands are quite tight and initially widen somewhat before narrowing to zero.
The speed of convergence, although relatively fast, is in line with that observed for major
oil exporters in Esfahani et al. (2012a).
3.3.2 Testing the Weak Exogeneity Assumption
Weak exogeneity of the country-specic foreign variables, xit =

yit; 

it; eq

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
, and
the global variables, poilt and q
oil
t , with respect to the long-run parameters of the conditional
model is vital in the construction and the implementation of the GVAR model. We formally
test this assumption following the procedure in Johansen (1992) and Harbo et al. (1998). To
this end, we rst estimate the 38 VARX*(si; si ) models separately under the assumption that
the foreign and global variables are weakly exogenous. We then run the following regression
for each lth element of xit :
xit;l = il +
riX
j=1
ij;lECM
j
i;t 1 +
siX
k=1
'ik;lxi;t k +
niX
m=1
#im;lexi;t m + "it;l; (14)
where ECM ji;t 1, j = 1; 2; :::; ri, are the estimated error correction terms corresponding to the
ri cointegrating relations found for the ith country model, ni = 2 (although it could be set
equal to si ), and exit = x0it ; reerit;poilt ;qoilt 0.12 Under the null hypothesis that the
variables are weakly exogenous, the error correction term must not be signicant; therefore,
the formal test for weak exogeneity is an F -test of the joint hypothesis that ij;l = 0 for
each j = 1; 2; :::; ri in equation (14). The test results together with the 95% critical values
are reported in Table 6, from which we see that the weak exogeneity assumption cannot be
rejected for the overwhelming majority of the variables considered. In fact, only 7 out of 263
exogeneity tests turned out to be statistically signicant at the 5% level.
11The fast convergence for Iran is also documented in Esfahani et al. (2012b).
12Note that the models for U.S. and the GCC are specied di¤erently, see the discussion in Section 3.2.
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Table 6: F-Statistics for Testing the Weak Exogeneity of the Country-Specic
Foreign Variables, Oil Prices, and Oil Production
Notes: * denotes statistical signicance at the 5% level.
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More specically, in terms of the variables in xit, only foreign output in the Indonesian
model and foreign short-term interest rates in the model for Argentina, Japan, and Nigeria
cannot be considered as weakly exogenous. This assumption is also rejected for the price of
oil in the Canadian model, and oil production in the Euro Area and Iranian models. However,
considering the signicance level assumed here, even if the weak exogeneity assumption is
always valid, we would expect up to 14 rejections, 5% of the 263 tests. Therefore, overall,
the available evidence in Table 6 supports our treatment of the foreign and global variables
in the individual VARX* models as weakly exogenous.
3.3.3 Testing for Structural Breaks
Although the possibility of structural breaks is a fundamental problem in macroeconomic
modelling in general, this is more likely to be a concern for a particular set of countries in
our sample (i.e., emerging economies and non-OECD oil exporters) which have experienced
both social and political changes since 1979. However, given that the individual VARX*
models are specied conditional on the foreign variables in xit, they are more robust to the
possibility of structural breaks in comparison to reduced-form VARs, as the GVAR setup
can readily accommodate co-breaking. See Dees et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion.
We test the null of parameter stability using the residuals from the individual reduced-
form error correction equations of the country-specic VARX*(si; si )models, initially looking
at the maximal OLS cumulative sum statistic (PKsup) and its mean square variant (PKmsq)
of Ploberger and Krämer (1992). We also test for parameter constancy over time against
non-stationary alternatives as proposed by Nyblom (1989) (NY ), and consider sequential
Wald statistics for a single break at an unknown change point. More specically, the mean
Wald statistic of Hansen (1992) (MW ), the Wald form of the Quandt (1960) likelihood
ratio statistic (QLR), and the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) Wald statistics based on the
exponential average (APW ). Finally, we also examine the heteroscedasticity-robust versions
of NY , MW , QLR, and APW:
Table 7 presents the number of rejections of the null hypothesis of parameter constancy
per variable across the country-specic models at the 5% signicance level. For brevity,
test statistics and bootstrapped critical values are not reported here but are available on
request. Overall, it seems that most regression coe¢ cients are stable, however, the results
vary considerably across di¤erent tests. In the case of the two PK tests, the null hypothesis
is rejected between 3:4   7:8% of the time. For the NY , MW , QLR; and APW tests on
the other hand, we note that the rejection rate is much larger, between 17:9   52:5%. The
QLR and APW rejection rates, for the joint null hypothesis of coe¢ cient and error variance
stability, are particularly high with 94 and 89 cases respectively out of 179 being rejected.
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Table 7: Number of Rejections of the Null of Parameter Constancy per Variable
across the Country-specic Models at the 5 percent Signicance Level
Tests y  eq (e  p) rS rL Total
PKsup 5 4 2 1 2 0 14(7:8)
PKmsq 4 1 0 1 0 0 6(3:4)
NY 8 5 4 5 4 6 32(17:9)
robust-NY 5 2 5 2 1 3 18(10:1)
QLR 22 18 20 18 9 7 94(52:5)
robust-QLR 6 4 6 2 6 4 28(15:6)
MW 12 10 10 9 6 6 53(29:6)
robust-MW 10 6 3 3 6 5 33(18:4)
APW 17 18 20 18 9 7 89(49:7)
robust-APW 7 5 6 3 6 4 31(17:3)
Notes: The test statistics PKsup and PKmsq are based on the cumulative sums of OLS residuals, NY is the
Nyblom test for time-varying parameters and QLR, MW and APW are the sequential Wald statistics for a
single break at an unknown change point. Statistics with the prex robustdenote the heteroskedasticity-
robust version of the tests. All tests are implemented at the 5% signicance level. The number in brackets
are the percentage rejection rates.
However, looking at the robust version of these tests, we note that the rejection rate falls
considerably to between 10.1% and 18.4%. Therefore, although we nd some evidence for
structural instability, it seems that possible changes in error variances rather than parameter
coe¢ cients is the main reason for this. We deal with this issue by using bootstrapped means
and condence bounds when undertaking the impulse response analysis.
4 Identication of Oil Shocks
Understanding the factors driving crude oil-price developments is essential for assessing their
economic e¤ects. We compare the macroeconomic consequences of supply-driven versus
demand-driven oil-price shocks across a set of developed and developing countries that are
structurally very diverse with respect to the role of oil and other forms of energy in their
economies.
To discriminate oil-supply disturbances from oil-demand shocks, we rely on a simple
identication scheme within our GVAR framework. More specically, we require negative
oil-supply shocks to be associated with: (i) an increase in oil prices; (ii) a decrease in global
oil production levels; and (iii) a decline in the sum of real output across all oil importers
during the rst year. We do not impose any restrictions on real output for the GCC region or
the other 11 countries in our sample that have been net oil exporters over the sample period,
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as the e¤ect of a negative supply shock on the level of GDP for this group is ambiguous, see
Table 8. To the extent that no other economically meaningful shocks are able to produce a
negative correlation between real output and real oil prices across all oil-importing economies,
this identication scheme uniquely identies oil-supply shocks. For oil-demand shocks on the
other hand, we require an increase in: (i) oil prices; (ii) oil production levels; and (iii) the
sum of real output across the 36 countries and two regions within the rst year.13
Table 8: Identication of Structural Shocks
Structural shocks poil qoil yimporters yexporters  eq rS rL reer
Oil supply > 0 < 0  0            
Oil demand > 0 > 0  0  0          
Notes: For the denition of the variables see equations (9) and (11). For the list of the 12 oil exporting and
26 importing countries/regions, see Table 1.
Sign restrictions alone are not su¢ ciently informative in identifying the macroeconomic
e¤ects of oil-demand and oil-supply shocks. Kilian and Murphy (2010) argue that it is
important to augment these restrictions with other sets of identifying assumptions (such
as quantity restrictions: bounds on impact price elasticities of oil demand and oil supply)
to narrow the set of admissible structural models. We show that the global dimension
of the GVAR model can be used as an alternative option to calculating the true structural
impulse responses. Specically, condition (iii) imposes that the cumulated sum of the relevant
individual-country outputs are negative if faced with an oil-supply shock, and positive if an
oil-demand shock prevails. We also considered a cumulated weighted average of the outputs,
using PPP GDP weights, and obtained very similar results. We will therefore focus on the
results using the simple cumulated sum of the output responses in the remainder of the
paper.
Let vit denote the structural VARX* model innovations given by:
vit = ~Piuit;
where ~Pi is a ki  ki matrix of coe¢ cients to be identied. We carry out a Cholesky
decomposition of the covariance matrix of the vector of residuals uit for each country model
13Mohaddes and Raissi (2011) show that for an oil-importing but labor-exporting small open economy
which receives large (and stable) inows of external income (the sum of FDI, remittances, and grants) from
oil-rich countries, the impact of oil shocks on the economys macroeconomic variables can be very similar to
those of the oil exporters from which it receives these large income ows.
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i (= 0; :::; N) to obtain the lower triangular matrix Pi that satises vi = PiP
0
i. However,
for any orthogonal ki  ki matrix Qi, the matrix ~Pi = PiQi also satises vi = ~Pi~P0i. To
examine a wide range of possible solutions for ~Pi and construct a set of admissible models, we
repeatedly draw at random from the orthogonal matrices Qi and discard candidate solutions
for ~Pi that do not satisfy a set of a priori sign restrictions on the implied impulse responses
functions. These rotations are based on the QR decomposition.
More compactly, we construct the k  k matrix ~P as
~P =
0BBBBBBB@
~P0 0       0
0
. . .
...
... ~Pi
...
...
. . . 0
0       0 ~PN
1CCCCCCCA
;
which can be used to obtain the impulse responses of all endogenous variables in the GVAR
model to shocks to the error terms vt = (v00t; : : : ;v
0
it; : : : ;v
0
Nt)
0 = ~Put. We draw until we
retain 100 valid rotations that satisfy our set of a priori sign restrictions.
Since there are many impulse responses that satisfy the postulated signs, we summarize
them by reporting a central tendency and the 16th and 84th percentiles as measures of the
spread of responses. It is important to recognize that the distribution here is across di¤erent
models and it has nothing to do with sampling uncertainty. The cross-sectional dimension
of the GVAR model, as explained above, can help with reducing these spreads.
4.1 Oil-Supply Shocks
Figures 24 show the estimated median impulse responses (for up to seven years) of key
macroeconomic variables of oil exporters and major oil-importing countries to a supply-
driven oil-price shock, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The macro-
economic consequences of a negative oil-supply shock are very di¤erent for oil-importing
countries compared to energy-exporters. With regard to real output, following an oil-supply
shock, Euro Area and the United States (two major energy-importing countries) experience
a long-lived fall in economic activity, while for China and Japan the impact is positive.
The results for the Euro Area and U.S. are as expected, but the positive output impact
for China seems surprising at rst. However, given Chinas heavy dependence on coal, as
opposed to oil, for its energy consumption needs, this result might not be that surprising
after all. In contrast to the United States (Euro Area) for which 37% (40%) and 23%
(12%) of primary energy needs are met from oil and coal sources, respectively, coal provided
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Figure 2: Impact of Oil-Supply Shocks on Major Oil Importers
Notes: Figures are median impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in the price of oil, equivalent
to around a 12% rise per quarter, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The impact is in
percentage points and the horizon is quarterly.
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Figure 3: Impact of Oil-Supply Shocks on OPEC Countries
Notes: Figures are median impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in the price of oil, equivalent
to around a 12% rise per quarter, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The impact is in
percentage points and the horizon is quarterly.
24
Figure 4: Impact of Oil-Supply Shocks on OECD Oil Exporters
Notes: Figures are median impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in the price of oil, equivalent
to around a 12% rise per quarter, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The impact is in
percentage points and the horizon is quarterly.
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over 70% of Chinas primary energy needs in 2010, while oil amounted to less than 18% of
the total. In fact, China accounts for just under half of global coal consumption, and its
coal use has almost doubled during the recent oil boom (2002-2008), and has more than
doubled over the last decade (see British Petroleums Statistical Review of World Energy).
Therefore, considering the dominance of coal (rather than oil) in the Chinese economy, and
given that most (if not all) of its coal consumption is met by domestic production, oil-supply
disruptions (which may also increase global coal prices) will have relatively less of an impact
on the Chinese economy. Moreover, given a near vertical oil-supply curve, oil exporters
might experience a real GDP boost following an oil-price spike, and because Chinas trade
with major oil exporters comprises more than 14% of its total trade, we would expect higher
import demand by oil exporters to positively a¤ect aggregate demand in China. Therefore,
the negative e¤ect on domestic output following an oil-supply shock may not necessarily
manifest itself in China. The positive impact of a supply-driven oil-price shock on Japans
GDP can be explained through the trade channel, as Japan conducts more than 22% of its
trade with major oil exporters.
The increase in real GDP following a decline in the rate of global oil production is also doc-
umented in Chapter 3 of International Monetary Fund (2011) WEO for the Emerging Asian
countries (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand) and Japan. The prediction of this model is that a gradual (but moderate)
increase in oil scarcity may not present a major constraint on emerging economiesgrowth
(especially for Japan and China) in the medium to long term, although the wealth trans-
fer from oil importers to exporters would increase capital ows and widen current account
imbalances. More specically, following a fall in global oil production, simulations of Inter-
national Monetary Fund (2011) WEO show that the real GDP of Japan and China would
increase for the rst 20 quarters (under a number of alternative scenarios).
Turning to the major oil exporters in our sample, these can be split into two subsets. It
appears that an oil-supply shock permanently increases output for those oil exporters that
possess signicant amounts of proven oil reserves, and for which the reserve-to-production
ratio (given in the brackets in terms of years) is large: Canada (26), Ecuador (34), Iran
(88), Libya (77), Nigeria (42), and Venezuela (>100), see Figure 3. On the other hand for
those countries with limited oil reserves and low oil reserve-to-production ratios, the impact
is muted. For example, for Algeria (18) and Mexico (11), we see a temporary increase in
real output, while for Norway (9), we have a permanent decrease in output.
For the GCC countries, the income e¤ect of an oil-supply shock is initially positive but
turns negative in the long run. This is mainly due to the inclusion of the global oil production
variable in the GCC model. Interestingly, for Indonesia and the UK, the impact of an oil-
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supply shock on domestic output is negative. This is expected for the UK, as its oil exports
started to decline rapidly in 1999 and it has been a net oil importer since 2006. Indonesian
oil production, on the other hand, peaked in mid 1990s, and the share of oil exports in GDP
has been declining steadily over the past three decades, so the impact should be similar to
that of the UK, which is in fact what we observe.
Overall, while oil-importing countries typically face a permanent fall (in the long run) in
economic activity in response to a supply-driven surge in oil prices, the impact is positive
for energy-exporting countries that possess large proven oil/gas reserves and those for which
the oil income to GDP ratio is expected to remain high over a prolonged period. This result
contrasts with the standard literature on "Dutch disease" and the "resource curse", which
primarily focuses on short-run implications of a temporary resource discovery. For major
oil exporters, many of which started oil extraction and exports at the beginning of the 20th
Century, the reserve-to-extraction ratio indicates that they are capable of producing for
many more decades even in the absence of new oil-eld discoveries or major advances in oil
exploration and extraction technologies. However, while it is clear that oil and gas reserves
will be exhausted eventually, this is likely to take place over a relatively long period.
Our results are in line with those of Peersman and Van Robays (2012), who show that a
negative oil-supply shock results in a permanent fall in economic activity of net oil-importing
countries and a positive impact (though at times not statistically signicant) on oil-exporters.
Our results are also supported by Esfahani et al. (2012a), who develop an empirical growth
model for major oil exporters and provide estimates for the positive long-run e¤ects of oil
income on GDP growth rates for six OPEC member states (Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela).
We also nd strong inationary pressures on the four energy-importing countries (China,
Euro Area, Japan, and the U.S.), but the responses are negligible or even negative in net
energy-exporting countries. These di¤erent responses are probably driven by movements of
the real exchange rate of oil-exporting countries. The real exchange rate tends to appreciate
in most oil-exporting countries, limiting the pass-through e¤ect of higher international oil
prices to domestic markets (and ination). The interest rate responses after an oil-supply
shock are generally in accordance with the e¤ects on ination, i.e. only in oil-importing
countries, where monetary policy is tightened to stabilize ination.
27
4.2 Oil-Demand Shocks
The rising demand for commodities by emerging markets mainly by China and India, but
also the Middle East and Latin America is a frequently-cited factor in explaining the recent
rise in oil-prices, see for instance Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2009). While the long-term
upward trend in commodity prices is reective of growing demand, the short-term increases
are often driven more by supply uctuations.
Figures 57 show the median impulse responses of key variables of oil-importing/exporting
countries to a demand-driven oil-price shock, together with the 16th and 84th percentile er-
ror bands. The macroeconomic e¤ects of a demand-driven oil-price shock are substantially
di¤erent from those of an oil-supply disturbance (examined in Figures 24). Following an oil-
demand shock, almost all countries in our sample experience long-run inationary pressures
and a short-run increase in real output. This nding is not surprising given that the oil-price
spike is assumed to be determined endogenously by a shift in worldwide economic activity.
Output can rise because the country itself is in a boom, or because it indirectly gains from
trade with the rest of the world. These results are echoed by Peersman and Van Robays
(2012) who show that a demand-driven oil-price shock results in a temporary increase of real
GDP for their set of OECD countries. Furthermore, in all major oil-importing countries,
interest rates increase while equity prices fall.
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Figure 5: Impact of Oil-Demand Shocks on Major Oil Importers
Notes: Figures are median impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in the price of oil, equivalent
to around a 12% rise per quarter, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The impact is in
percentage points and the horizon is quarterly.
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Figure 6: Impact of Oil-Demand Shocks on OPEC Countries
Notes: Figures are median impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in the price of oil, equivalent
to around a 12% rise per quarter, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The impact is in
percentage points and the horizon is quarterly.
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Figure 7: Impact of Oil-Demand Shocks on OECD Oil Exporters
Notes: Figures are median impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in the price of oil, equivalent
to around a 12% rise per quarter, together with the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The impact is in
percentage points and the horizon is quarterly.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this study we applied the sign restriction approach to a Global VAR model including
major oil exporters, estimated for 38 countries/regions over the period 1979Q2 to 2011Q2,
to identify the di¤erential e¤ects of supply-driven versus demand-driven oil-price shocks. In
doing so we demonstrated that the global dimension of the GVAR model can provide a large
number of additional sign restrictions, and is thus helpful in moving us closer to calculating
true structural impulse responses.
Our results indicate that the underlying source of the oil-price shock is crucial in determin-
ing its macroeconomic consequence for oil-importing countries as well as major commodity
exporters. In particular, the di¤erentiation between a net energy importer and a net oil
exporter is only important when studying the macroeconomic e¤ects of a supply-driven oil-
price shock. While oil importers typically experience a long-lived fall in economic activity
in response to a supply-driven surge in oil prices, the impact is positive for energy-exporting
countries that possess large proven oil/gas reserves. Cross-country di¤erences are absent
though when it comes to the demand side of the global crude oil market. In response to an
oil-demand disturbance, almost all countries in our sample experience a short-run increase
in real output and face additional inationary pressures.
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Data Appendix
Real GDP
We use the International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
World Economic Outlook (WEO) databases to compile the real GDP data. The 18 countries
that we add to the GVAR dataset of Smith and Galesi (2010) are divided into two groups.
First, those for which quarterly data are available. Second, those for which annual data are
available.
For the rst group (Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia), we use the
IFS 99BVPZF series (GDP VOL) when available quarterly data on GDP are reported since
1991Q1, 2002Q1, 1988Q1, 1992Q1, 1990Q1, and 2000Q1 for Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Jordan,
Morocco, and Tunisia, respectively. We seasonally adjust these quarterly observations using
the U.S. Census Bureaus X-12 ARIMA seasonal adjustment program.14 Quarterly series
are then interpolated (backwards) linearly from the annual series either from the IFS or
WEO using the same method as that applied by Dees et al. (2007).
For the second group (Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria,
Oman, Qatar, Syria, Venezuela, and UAE), either the annual seasonally unadjusted IFS
series (BVPZF and B..ZF) or the WEO real GDP series are interpolated to obtain the
quarterly values. These series are then treated as the quarterly seasonally unadjusted data.
Consumer price index
We obtain seasonally adjusted quarterly observations on the consumer price index (CPI)
for all added countries from the International Monetary Funds INS database. Quarterly
data on CPI are available since 1991Q1, 1980Q1, 2003Q2, and 1980Q1 for Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, respectively. Annual WEO CPI series are interpolated
linearly (backwards) to obtain quarterly observations for the missing values for these four
countries.
Exchange rates
The IFS AE.ZF series are collected for all added 18 countries from the IMF IFS database.
14For further information see U.S. Census Bureau (2007): X-12-ARIMA Reference Manual at
http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/
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Short term interest rates
The IMF IFS database is the main source of data for short term interest rates. The IFS
discount rate (60...ZF series) is used for Algeria, Ecuador, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania,
and Venezuela. The IFS deposit rate (60L..ZF series) is used for Bahrain, Egypt, Nigeria,
Oman, Qatar, and Syria. The IFS three-month interbank deposit rate or the money market
rate (60B..ZF series) is used for Kuwait and Tunisia.
PPP-GDP weights
The main source for the country-specic GDP weights is the World Development Indicator
database of the World Bank.
Trade matrices
To construct the trade matrices, we use the direction of trade statistics from the International
Monetary Funds Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. For all the countries
considered we downloaded the matrix of exports and imports (c.i.f.) with annual frequency.
The 38 38 trade-weight matrix is provided in Table 9.
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